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Intergroup conflict aversion weakens intragroup cooperation

Jonathan H.W. Tan and Friedel Bolle
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Jonathan H.W. Tan: Department of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Friedel Bolle: European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany

No 1904, Economic Growth Centre Working Paper Series from Nanyang Technological University, School of Social Sciences, Economic Growth Centre

Abstract: We experimentally analyze dynamic strategies and social preferences in repeated intergroup conflicts where helping partners hurts rivals. Subjects are observed to be prosocial and conflict averse, in that they cooperate more when it benefits the ingroup but hold back when it inflicts losses on the outgroup. Our structural quantal response model with limited lookahead and group-specific altruism explains the data best: subjects expect partners to play cooperative strategies, whilst they are altruistic towards rivals. Social Value Orientation responses confirm that prosocials are relatively more conflict averse, which in turn weakens cooperation.

Keywords: cooperation; conflict; altruism; quantal response; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D74 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2019-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nan:wpaper:1904

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