Social evolution leads to persistent corruption

Joung-Hun Lee, Yoh Iwasa, Ulf Dieckmann and Karl Sigmund ()
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Joung-Hun Lee: Institute of Decision Science for a Sustainable Society, Kyushu University, 819-0395 Fukuoka, Japan; Department of Biology, Kyushu University, Nishiku, 819-0395 Fukuoka, Japan
Yoh Iwasa: Department of Biology, Kyushu University, Nishiku, 819-0395 Fukuoka, Japan; Department of Bioscience, School of Science and Technology, Kwansei-Gakuin University, 669-1337 Sanda-Shi Hyogo, Japan
Ulf Dieckmann: Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria; Department of Evolutionary Studies of Biosystems, The Graduate University for Advanced Studies (Sokendai), Hayama, Kanagawa 240-0193, Japan
Karl Sigmund: Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria; Faculty for Mathematics, University of Vienna, 1090 Vienna, Austria

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2019, vol. 116, issue 27, 13276-13281

Abstract: Cooperation can be sustained by institutions that punish free-riders. Such institutions, however, tend to be subverted by corruption if they are not closely watched. Monitoring can uphold the enforcement of binding agreements ensuring cooperation, but this usually comes at a price. The temptation to skip monitoring and take the institution’s integrity for granted leads to outbreaks of corruption and the breakdown of cooperation. We model the corresponding mechanism by means of evolutionary game theory, using analytical methods and numerical simulations, and find that it leads to sustained or damped oscillations. The results confirm the view that corruption is endemic and transparency a major factor in reducing it.

Keywords: cooperation; corruption; evolutionary game theory; social contract; punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nas:journl:v:116:y:2019:p:13276-13281

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