An evolutionary explanation for ineffective altruism

Bethany Burum (), Martin A. Nowak and Moshe Hoffman
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Bethany Burum: Harvard University
Martin A. Nowak: Harvard University
Moshe Hoffman: Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Nature Human Behaviour, 2020, vol. 4, issue 12, 1245-1257

Abstract: Abstract We donate billions to charities each year, yet much of our giving is ineffective. Why are we motivated to give but not to give effectively? Building on evolutionary game theory, we argue that donors evolved (genetically or culturally) to be insensitive to efficacy because people tend not to reward efficacy, as social rewards tend to depend on well-defined and highly observable behaviours. We present five experiments testing key predictions of this account that are difficult to reconcile with alternative accounts based on cognitive or emotional limitations. Namely, we show that donors are more sensitive to efficacy when helping (1) themselves or (2) their families. Moreover, (3) social rewarders don’t condition on efficacy or other difficult-to-observe behaviours (4, 5), such as the amount donated.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1038/s41562-020-00950-4

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