Learning about one’s own type in two-sided search

Akiko Maruyama

No 10-26, GRIPS Discussion Papers from National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies

Abstract: This paper is an analysis of a two-sided search model in which agents are vertically heterogeneous and some agents do not know their own types. Agents who do not know their own types update their beliefs about their own types through the offers or rejections that they receive from others. In the belief-updating process, an agent who is unsure of his or her own type frequently behaves as an over- or underconfident agent. In this paper, we show that this apparent over- or underconfidence influences both on the individual’s and other agents’ matching behaviors. We show, especially, that the apparent overconfidence of some agents prevents the lowest-type agents from matching in an equilibrium.

Keywords: two-sided search; imperfect self-knowledge; overconfidence; looking-glass self (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-dge and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ngi:dpaper:10-26

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