The Effect of Fiscal Transparency on the Provision of a Public Good: An Experimental Analysis

Julian Krause

management revue - Socio-Economic Studies, 2020, vol. 31, issue 3, 309-323

Abstract: This paper presents a model and experimental results of a public good game to explore the effects of fiscal transparency on the provision of a public good. Two types of fiscal transparency are explored. The first is the transparency of the decision-making process and the second is the transparency of government spending. To answer this question a model for the public good “city district quality” with heterogeneous agents is set up and the design and the results of the experiment are presented.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.5771/0935-9915-2020-3-309

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