 Conflict of Interest Regulation in the Public Service: Brazilian Experience. (Part two)Varvara Vasileva
Public administration issues, 2015, issue 3, 165-190 Abstract: The paper argues that the existing model of civil service anticorruption reform by importing best practice of conflict of interests regulation in the public service does not help to tackle or minimize corruption, but creates a vicious circle both in theory and practice. Corruption studies artificially segment corruption into independent macro- and micro-levels, and research contributing to one of the levels does not improve our understanding of corruption. Failed, long-lasting or, having unexpected results, recent administrative reforms clearly demonstrate insufficiency of importing the model as an anti-corruption measure. The model of corruption markets, presented in the article, explains the insufficiency of importing best practice, and demonstrates that the good enough governance tactic is able to minimize the national corruption market. The good enough governance has a good implication for unsolved problems of the Russian public service: one could never become Singapore by importing Singapores best practice regulations. Russian good enough governance of conflict of interests regulation in the public service might be adapting the experience of Brazils anti-corruption reform in the civil service (as the one that solved the same problems with the similar lack of resources). The paper presents a thorough analysis of the anti-corruption reform in Brazil, based on the study of regulations that were introduced by Cardoso and his successors (mid. 1990s-2015) and is structured according to the aims of the reform. Three mutually reinforcing groups of measures were introduced: decreasing politicization of the Brazil civil service, regulating conflict of interests in the most sensitive areas (such as public procurement) and ethic regulations. The research conducted has practical implications for the Russian public service - incremental mechanism for reforming the national public service and, consequently, minimizing the national corruption market. Keywords: conflict of interests regulation; Cardoso’s reform; Public Ethics Commission; corruption markets; politicization of the public service; Ficha Limpa; Bresser Pereira; OECD Anti-Bribery convention; UNCAC; good enough governance (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nos:vgmu00:2015:i:3:p:165-190 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Public administration issues from Higher School of Economics |
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