"Institutional Traps" of Post-privatisation Period in Russia

A. Oleynik

Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2004, issue 6

Abstract: Economic reforms in the post-Soviet countries have led to a number of unintended results. The explanation consists in not taking into consideration the institutional constraints existed in these countries, both formal and informal. In particular, the nature of authority relationship must be included in economic analysis. The unintended results of the privatization programs of the 1990s are discussed as an example. The emerged structure of property rights is far from being efficient (e.g., the corporative governance is weak) and socially just. However, the forced redistribution of property right will worsen the situation, as far as the nature of authority relationships — the imposed authority — remains constant.

Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2004:id:1908

DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2004-6-79-94

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