Endogenous Opportunism in the Principal-Agent Theory

E. Popov and V. Simonova

Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2005, issue 3

Abstract: The point of the article is studying basic problems of the firm institutional theory - opportunism behavior problem in a principal-agent relationship system on the firm level. The article is devoted to the analysis of the essence of opportunism as economic category, definition of basic forms of inside opportunism and estimation of their influence on performance of firms of the Ural region. Factors that influence the level of opportunism are classified.

Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nos:voprec:y:2005:id:1422

DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2005-3-118-130

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