Arms Races and Conflict: Experimental Evidence

Klaus Abbink, Lu Dong () and Lingbo Huang
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Lu Dong: Economics Experimental Laboratory, Nanjing Audit University

No 2019-01, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: We study escalation and aggression in an experimental first-strike game in which two participants play multiple rounds of a money-earning task. In each round, both players can spend money to accumulate weapons. The player with more weapons can spend money to strike against the other player, which almost totally eliminates the victim’s earnings potential and removes their capacity to strike. Weapons can serve as a means of deterrence. In four treatments, we find that deterrence is strengthened if weapon stocking cannot be observed, that a balance of power is effective in maintaining peace, and that mutually beneficial trade decreases the risk of confrontation, but not necessarily the likelihood of costly arms races.

Keywords: Mutually assured destruction; balance of power; arms races; deterrence; trade; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-war
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Arms Races and Conflict: Experimental Evidence (2021)
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