 Inventory and Financial Strategies with Capital Constraints and Limited Joint LiabilityBin Cao, Xin Chen, T. C. Edwin Cheng, Yuan-Guang Zhong and Yong-Wu Zhou Foundations and Trends(R) in Technology, Information and Operations Management, 2020, vol. 14, issue 1-2, 44-59 Abstract: We study the financial and operational decisions of two capital-constrained firms via a limited joint liability (LJL) financing scheme offered by a bank. We construct a two-stage game model in which the firms separately determine their individual ordering decisions according to the prior joint liability agreement between the firms and the bank. Applying non-cooperative game theory to analyze the decision-making problems of the two firms, we establish the existence of equilibrium decisions for the two firms. We derive mild conditions under which the LJL financing scheme is simultaneously preferred by the two firms. We show that the two firms’ strategies are complementary and the firms’ equilibrium order quantities are always positively influenced by the risk-sharing term. We find that a greater bank loan leverage ratio may not simultaneously improve the two firms’ performance. When the credit line and interest rate are endogenized by the bank, we provide insights on the relationship between the optimal interest rate and bank loan leverage ratio through risk hedging. Keywords: Supply chain management; New business financing :Bank financing; debt; and trade credit (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:fnttom:0200000096-3 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Foundations and Trends(R) in Technology, Information and Operations Management from now publishers |
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