Friends Don't Let Friends Free Ride

Nicholas Eubank and Dorothy Kronick

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2021, vol. 16, issue 4, 533-557

Abstract: Theory predicts that social sanctioning can solve the collective action problem, but only when people find out whether their peers participate. We evaluate this prediction using data from the near-universe of cell phone subscribers in Venezuela. Those whose behavior is more easily observed by peers are much more likely to protest and much more likely to sign a political petition than otherwise similar people in less-visible social network positions. Together with qualitative and survey data, we interpret this finding as evidence that social network structure can facilitate (or frustrate) social sanctioning as a solution to the collective action problem.

Keywords: Political participation; social networks; political networks; social movements; collective action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00020143

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