Religious Violence and Coalition Politics in History

Desiree Desierto and Mark Koyama

Journal of Historical Political Economy, 2024, vol. 4, issue 2, 281-309

Abstract: We employ selectorate theory to model how coalition-based politics determines the intensity with which a state persecutes members of minority religions. A coalition of elites provides political support to the ruler and, in exchange, the ruler shares rents and sets religious policy. We find that full religious freedom is only attainable if the costs of enforcing religious policy unambiguously decrease with the extent of toleration; otherwise, e.g. when tolerant policy induces local pogroms, some persecution is undertaken by the state. In this case, we find that persecution is more intense the larger the size of the ruler's coalition. We discuss the predictions of the model using several episodes of religious violence drawn from history.

Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlhpe:115.00000075

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