Auditor Lobbying on Accounting Standards

Abigail Allen, Karthik Ramanna and Sugata Roychowdhury

Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting, 2018, vol. 3, issue 2, 291-331

Abstract: We examine how Big N auditors’ changing incentives impact their comment-letter lobbying on U.S. GAAP over the first thirty-four years of the FASB (1973–2006). In particular, we focus on the influence of auditors’ lobbying incentives arising from two basic factors: managing expected litigation and regulatory costs and catering to clients’ preferences for flexibility in GAAP. We find evidence that auditor lobbying is driven by prevailing standards of litigation and regulatory scrutiny, but we find no evidence that catering to clients’ preferences for flexibility in GAAP drives auditor lobbying. Broadly, our paper offers the first large-sample descriptive analysis of the role of Big N auditors in the accounting standard-setting process.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/108.00000027 (application/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnllfa:108.00000027

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting from now publishers
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucy Wiseman ().