 Consequences of More Frequent Reporting: The U.K. ExperienceSuresh Nallareddy, Robert Pozen and Shivaram Rajgopal Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting, 2021, vol. 6, issue 1, 51-88 Abstract: The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is considering the pros and cons of (i) moving to semi-annual reporting from quarterly reporting, and/or (ii) making quarterly reporting less burdensome by allowing more qualitative disclosures. We exploit the start of less-burdensome and more frequent reporting by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in 2007 and the end of the requirement in 2014 in the United Kingdom to examine corporate and capital market behavior. After the imposition of more frequent reporting in 2007, we find (i) a dramatic decline in the number of companies that issue reports with quantitative information (defined as including both sales and earnings numbers for the quarter), (ii) a substantial increase in companies announcing managerial guidance for the upcoming year’s earnings or sales, and (iii) an increase in analyst following for all sample companies. Companies that voluntarily moved back from more frequent to semi-annual reporting after 2014 have experienced a reduction in analyst coverage. However, we find that the imposition of more frequent reporting and the end of such a requirement have virtually no impact on firms’ investment decisions. Keywords: Quarterly reporting; analyst following; investments; disclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnllfa:108.00000051 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting from now publishers |
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