Stability of Global Climate Cooperation Under Uncertainty

Jan Kersting

Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 2018, vol. 7, issue 3-4, 351-396

Abstract: International cooperation is needed to substantially reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and avoid dangerous climate change. The possibility of cooperation is influenced by the presence of uncertainty in both damages from climate change and the development of low-carbon technologies. This paper integrates uncertainty into an analysis of the stability of global climate cooperation, using cooperative game theory. I find that the deterministic result does not necessarily carry over to the case including uncertainty, and that the stability of global cooperation crucially depends on the ability of a coalition to redistribute risk between members with different levels of risk aversion. The results suggest that risk redistribution should feature prominently in the international climate regime.

Keywords: Climate change; Game theory; International climate regime; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D81 F53 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/102.00000081 (application/xml)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000081

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Strategic Behavior and the Environment from now publishers
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucy Wiseman ().