 Models of Central Banking and the Organisation of the Bank of EnglandNo 38, National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Policy Papers from National Institute of Economic and Social Research Abstract: In the quarter-century since the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee was established, the various financial operations of the Bank of England and of the Government have become more inter-dependent, as a result of the financial crisis, quantitative easing, the response to Covid-19, and uncertainties about fiscal policy. The separation of decision making among the various bodies within the Bank of England – the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee and the executive management of the Bank – has become anomalous. In practice, important decisions involving very large financial risks have been made by the executive management of the Bank, at meetings whose minutes have not been published, and there has sometimes been a lack of transparency. This applies in particular to the decision after the global financial crisis to avoid taking credit risk as far as possible, and instead, through quantitative easing, to take enormous interest rate risks on the public sector's behalf. The paper advocates a radical simplification of the Bank of England's management structure in the interests of more efficient decision making and greater transparency. Date: 2022-11 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nsr:niesrp:38 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) Policy Papers from National Institute of Economic and Social Research 2 Dean Trench Street Smith Square London SW1P 3HE. Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.