Wage Bargaining and Political Strength in the Public Sector

Torberg Falch and Bjarne Strøm

Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Abstract: This paper analysis the link between political strength and public sector wages using a unique matched individual-employer data set for Norwegian local governments during the period 1990-1998. The results indicate that political strength, measured in several ways, has a positive effect on wages, while administrative strength, measured by the tenure of the chief executive, has a negative effect. The positive effect of political strength is consistent with a model in which the budgetary process is a multistage game and employment is determined in an interaction with interest groups prior to the wage bargain.

Keywords: Public sector labor market; Wage bargaining; Political strength; Budgetary process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H72 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2003-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iso/WP/2003/6wagebWP.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Wage Bargaining and Political Strength in the Public Sector (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nst:samfok:3203

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