Equilibrium Departures From Common Knowledge in Games With Non-Additive Expected Utility

Sujoy Mukerji and Hyun Song Shin

Economics Papers from Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

Abstract: In a game where the players have non-additive beliefs, we explore the beliefs implicit in the equilibrium behaviour of the players. Under one interpretation, we can show that there are well-defined departures from common knowledge of the game among the players. Our argument revolves around a representation theorem which relates equilibrium under under non-additive beliefs to equilibrium actions of a set of types in a Bayesian game with a common prior. Among these types, the game is common p-belief, where the 'p' depends on the degree of uncertainty aversion. Only when the beliefs are additive is p=1.

Keywords: GAME; THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C79 D80 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nuf:econwp:137

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