Copeland Method II; Manipulation, Monotonicity, and Paradoxes

Vincent Merlin () and Donald G. Saari

No 1112, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: An important issue for economics and the decision sciences is to understand why allocation and decision procedures are plagued by manipulative and paradoxical behavior once there are n>3 or n=3 alternatives. Valuable insight is obtained by exploiting the relative simplicity of the widely used Copeland method (CM). By use of a geometric approach, we characterize all CM manipulation, monotonicity, consistency, and involvement properties while identifying which profiles are susceptible to these difficulties. For instance, we show that for n=3 candidates that the CM reduces the negative aspects of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.

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Journal Article: Copeland Method II: Manipulation, Monotonicity, and Paradoxes (1997)
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