Performance Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy

Gerald Marschke

Discussion Papers from University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of performance incentives in a federal job training program for the economically disadvantaged. I find that job training bureaucrats respond to incentives in ways that are consistent with a simple model of bureaucratic behavior. Additionally I am able to test whether attempts by the program's incentive designers to improve the precision of performance measures in the late 1980s increased or decreased efficiency. I discuss my results in the context of the greater incentive literature, as well as the literature on incentives in job training programs.

JEL-codes: D73 I38 J33 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Performance Incentives and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence from a Federal Bureaucracy (2000)
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