Serial Offenders: Why Some Industries Seem Prone to Endemic Collusion

Oecd

No 181, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers from OECD Publishing

Abstract: This paper was prepared as a background note for a discussion held at the 2015 OECD Global Forum on Competition on serial offenders. It explored why some industries seem prone to endemic collusion and others don't.

Date: 2015-10-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:dafaac:181-en

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