Independence of Competition Authorities - From Design to Practice

Oecd

No 195, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers from OECD Publishing

Abstract: Agency independence from political power is a key element of an effective competition regime. Competition authorities differ from each other and they operate in jurisdictions which often have significant legal, political and cultural differences. Thus, there is no one size-fit-for-all model for independence. However, there are some safeguards which can help agencies establish an arm’s length relationship with their government. This paper, prepared as background for a discussion on the topic held at the 2016 OECD Global Forum on Competition, discusses these safeguards and focusses on issues concerning appointment and dismissal of top management, the status of the agency, resources, priority-setting and supervision, and objectives of competition law.

Date: 2016-10-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:dafaac:195-en

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