Start-ups, Killer Acquisitions and Merger Control

Oecd

No 248, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers from OECD Publishing

Abstract: This paper explores the extent to which nascent acquisitions can be investigated and challenged when necessary under existing merger control frameworks. It identifies the need to conduct an in-depth counterfactual analysis, to consider new investigative tools, and to ensure that any claimed efficiencies are tied to the specific transaction in question. It was prepared as a background note for a discussion held at the OECD in June 2020 on start-ups, killer acquisitions and merger control.

Date: 2020-05-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:dafaac:248-en

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