The Optimal Design, Organisation and Powers of Competition Authorities

Oecd

No 304, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers from OECD Publishing

Abstract: This paper was prepared as a background note for discussions on “The Optimal Design, Organisation and Powers of Competition Authorities” taking place at the December 2023 session of the OECD Competition Committee’s Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement.

Date: 2023-10-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1787/dea26a24-en (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:dafaac:304-en

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers from OECD Publishing Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().