Interim measures in abuse of dominance investigations in Latin America and the Caribbean

Oecd

No 312, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers from OECD Publishing

Abstract: Interim measures are enforcement tools available to competition authorities to prevent harm to competition that may occur before a final decision on the existence of an infringement. Most often these decisions are related to an ongoing business practice that may potentially constitute an abuse of dominance infringement, when a dominant market player illegally engages in practices limiting competition. In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries, most competition authorities dispose of interim measures in their legal frameworks and many have used them in past years (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Peru). This paper provides an overview of the state of play of interim measures in the region covering legal frameworks, recent enforcement experiences, as well as challenges and particularities of LAC countries. The paper highlights that interim measures represent a powerful tool for competition authorities and should be carefully used to mitigate enforcement errors and related reputation risks.

Date: 2024-09-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ipr, nep-lam, nep-law and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:dafaac:312-en

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