Early resolution of cartel cases in Latin America and the Caribbean

Oecd

No 338, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers from OECD Publishing

Abstract: This paper provides an overview of the state of play of early resolution of cartel cases in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) jurisdictions, covering the legal framework, enforcement experiences, as well as challenges and particularities. Competition authorities may benefit from the early resolution of cartel cases by saving on time and the resources that the case would require in an adversarial procedure, allocating them more efficiently to the detection and prosecution of other cartels and providing for a greater deterrence and wider impact of their enforcement actions. The paper highlights that LAC competition authorities may consider designing and using these tools as a way to achieve procedural expediency. The design and implementation of early resolution programmes requires consideration of the incentives of parties to resolve cases early and the interplay with leniency programmes, damages and the pursuit of other policy objectives.

Keywords: cartel enforcement; competition law enforcement; early case resolution; Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); settlements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09-14
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:dafaac:338-en

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