Competition and agentic AI
Oecd
No 339, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers from OECD Publishing
Abstract:
Agentic AI systems extend the range of tasks, decisions and actions that users can delegate to AI. This paper examines competition within agentic AI markets and how it may affect competition more broadly. It considers implications for the supply of such systems, including concentration, vertical integration and platform gatekeeping, as well as their downstream use. It explores potential pro-competitive effects, such as reduced transaction costs and stronger demand-side pressure, alongside risks including collusion, market foreclosure and reduced transparency. It aims to identify key risk factors and assess how competition authorities and policymakers may respond.
Keywords: AI; antitrust; artificial intelligence; Collusion; competition; Information sharing; Market Power; Mergers; Technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 K21 L13 L15 L41 L86 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-11-12
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https://doi.org/10.1787/d1a3ee15-en (text/html)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:dafaac:339-en
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