Abnormally Low Tenders

Oecd

No 35, SIGMA Public Procurement Briefs from OECD Publishing

Abstract: This Brief examines how the lowest price is not always the best value for money in the long term and how contracting authorities should avoid accepting a tender that appears extremely advantageous but is not viable. In addition to protecting the public interest against the risk of non-performance or poor performance of a contract, the related provisions of the EU Directive support genuine competition between economic operators and reducing unfair advantages.

Keywords: EU directives; procurement tenders; public procurement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oec:govaag:35-en

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