Corporate Governance Responses to Director Rule Changes

Benjamin S. Kay () and Cindy M. Vojtech ()
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Benjamin S. Kay: Office of Financial Research
Cindy M. Vojtech: Federal Reserve Board

No 15-02, Staff Discussion Papers from Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury

Abstract: In 2002, U.S. stock exchanges and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act established minimum standards for director independence. The laws induced changes in firm agency controls is studied on a two new datasets (The Director Database and Equilar Executive Compensation) with a much larger range of firm size than previous studies. Firms most treated by the director rules increase leverage and decrease CEO stock ownership. This suggests that leverage complements and CEO ownership substitutes for outside director supervision. The average treated firm also increased interlocking directorships, the number of other boards its directors serve. The rules failed to reduce CEO misbehavior like excess compensation, heavy use of incentive-compensation, or low turnover. Additionally, treated firms do not outperform the market. These results are more consistent with governance optimization than either managerial entrenchment or compliance cost explanations.

Keywords: Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX); Corporate Governance; Governance Changes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2015-04-24
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