The Fiduciary Duty of Dissent
Joseph W. Yockey
No y9prg_v1, LawArchive from Center for Open Science
Abstract:
Organizations increasingly identify “dissent”—meaning the expression of disagreement with organizational strategies, decisions, or actions by employees who lack the power to execute change on their own—as a best practice and core value. But despite these pronouncements, employees at all levels often remain silent. Even powerful directors on corporate boards routinely decline to express disagreement with what they assume is the majority consensus. Alarmingly, this mindset can extend to critical safety issues. When asked why they do not speak up, many employees cite a fear of adverse personal or professional repercussions. Others simply believe that speaking up is pointless because they will be ignored. When these attitudes prevail, firms are deprived of the important knowledge gains that result from dissent. In extreme cases, the lack of dissent can lead to major ethical lapses and even the loss of human life. This Article argues that organizational dissent is much more than a facet of management ethics and good institutional citizenship; it is a firmly embedded—albeit traditionally overlooked—feature of classic fiduciary law. By illuminating the strong pro-dissent norms that are inherent in the traditional duties of care, loyalty, and performance owed by corporate fiduciaries, this Article reconceptualizes dissent as a fiduciary duty. In so doing, it not only reinvigorates the academic and legal understanding of organizational dissent; it also gives new teeth to managerial efforts to stimulate meaningful dissent. A fiduciary understanding of dissent enhances organizational engagement with dissent and helps to re-center efforts to promote compliance, manage risk, and diversify all levels of organizations, including corporate boards.
Date: 2026-10-15
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:lawarc:y9prg_v1
DOI: 10.31228/osf.io/y9prg_v1
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