Ecologically-mediated collective action in commons with tipping elements

Wolfram Barfuss, Jonathan Donges and Matthias Bethge
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Wolfram Barfuss: University of Bonn

No 7pcnm, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Collective, cooperative action is critical to sustaining the commons safely away from dangerous tipping elements. Previous work has found a variety of mechanisms for the emergence of cooperation through social interactions. Yet, they cannot always work. Here, we present a theory of ecologically-mediated collective action in commons with tipping elements. We show that even without any direct social interactions, commons with tipping elements can result in a plurality of social incentive regimes, some beneficial for collective conservation, others detrimental. We underpin all incentive regimes with dynamic and boundedly rational collective reinforcement learning. We highlight how our theory can be applied to an ecologically-mediated governance of the commons. Our theory predicts the existence of social tipping points at which collective cooperation becomes self-enforcing and self-sustaining, enabled only by the actors' environmental embeddedness.

Date: 2024-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:7pcnm

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/7pcnm

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