Oligarchic Networks of Influence and Legislatures in Developing Democracies: Evidence from Ukraine

Silviya Nitsova
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Silviya Nitsova: University of Manchester

No k27ez_v1, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: State capture by extremely wealthy elites is a widespread phenomenon in developing democracies, yet the mechanisms through which it works and the impact it has on political and policy outcomes remain poorly understood. I develop a network-based approach to studying captured institutions. Focusing on the national legislature and using social network and regression analyses of unique quantitative data and original interview-based evidence on the case of Ukraine (2014-2022), I demonstrate that oligarchs seek to defend their wealth by promoting as members of parliament individuals who are linked to them via interpersonal ties. The connections between oligarchs and legislators take the form of a highly fragmented, weakly connected, and decentralized network with distinct clusters, in which oligarchs occupy central positions, and influence the adoption of policies related to oligarchs' economic interests. The study has important implications for the scholarship on money in politics, oligarchy, state capture, political connections, neopatrimonialism, legislative politics, political parties, and political representation.

Date: 2025-06-23
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:k27ez_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/k27ez_v1

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