Rent-controlled Resources: Why are we under-charging Australia's mining tenants?

Cameron Murray and Tim Helm
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Cameron Murray: The University of Sydney
Tim Helm: Independent economic consultant

No qw28a_v1, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Mineral rights are Crown property, belonging to all Australians. Royalties in their current form are an inflexible and inefficient method of pricing public property rights – like rent control for housing, they protect mining tenants from paying full market value. State governments, as resource managers, are giving Australia’s resource companies a cushy deal at the public’s expense. If Australia captured resource rents as effectively as Norway, governments could raise up to $66 billion more in revenue each year – enough to fund the abolition of payroll tax and stamp duty. A straightforward adjustment to royalty regimes, inspired by Queensland’s recent reforms, could yield an additional $14.5 billion per year by way of more commercially-oriented resource pricing.

Date: 2024-11-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:qw28a_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/qw28a_v1

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