Making Elections More Transparent? Lessons from the Implementation of Digital Imprints at the 2024 UK General Election

Kate Dommett, Steph Luke and Hazel Gordon
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Kate Dommett: University of Sheffield

No unb26_v1, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Transparency has often been proposed as a solution to the use of digital technology in election campaigns. Advancing the idea that providing increased information to voters can assuage democratic concerns, to date existing research has shown that transparency disclosures can have effects on citizens’ information consumption. And yet, what has been less examined is how transparency reforms are being enacted in practice, and whether compliance is in line with desired outcomes. In this paper we examine the implementation of a new disclosure requirement in the UK for ‘digital imprints’ on campaign materials. Auditing practice at the 2024 General Election, we find considerable diversity in compliance by platform and different types of campaigners. Our findings show that whilst it is technically possible to comply with digital imprints guidance on ‘gold standard’ compliance, there is considerable diversity in practice across types of campaign material and by different actors. Accordingly, we recommend regulators take two courses of action; first, promoting best practice to boost understanding of ‘gold standard’ compliance, and second, amending guidance to simplify instructions and aid clarity. Our findings offer practical insights for regulations, but more broadly raise questions about the study of transparency disclosure, showing that ideal practice should not be presumed.

Date: 2024-09-24
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:unb26_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/unb26_v1

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