Coca Politics: Electoral Accountability and Tough-on-Crime Policies in Colombia

Juan David Gelvez
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Juan David Gelvez: University of Maryland

No yn9rz, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Governments across the Global South widely rely on tough-on-crime policies to control illicit drug production. Advocates argue these policies are necessary to control cartels; detractors claim they undermine human rights and ultimately yield minimal results in reducing drug production. How do these policies affect the government’s support? Who supports harsh crime policies? This paper addresses these puzzles by examining the political benefits of coca eradication in Colombia. I show that despite the electoral cost in coca-growing areas, politicians who rely on harsh eradication policies are more likely to benefit electorally, as their core supporters perceive aerial spraying as an effective strategy to combat drug production. Using a dynamic difference-in-differences design and a nationally representative survey, I show that right-wing politicians benefited politically from its aerial spraying eradication efforts, despite the punishment of voters living in coca-growing regions.

Date: 2024-07-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-law and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:yn9rz

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/yn9rz

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