Does Crime Matter? The Politics of Crime Prevention in Colombia

Juan David Gelvez
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Juan David Gelvez: University of Maryland

No znyq5, OSF Preprints from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Why do governments prevent crime in some places and not others? Who are the primary beneficiaries of the security provision? This paper examines how the incumbent uses crime prevention projects as a pork-barrel good, in order to finance swing-voter municipalities. Using a mixed-method approach, which includes the analysis of a granular dataset of crime prevention funds and interviews with policymakers and bureaucrats, I study how electoral incentives can explain differences in security provision in Colombia. To do so, I conduct several fixed effect models and a regression discontinuity design that measures the effects of electoral results on money distribution, taking advantage of party alignment and margin of victory. I also interviewed policymakers and bureaucrats to shed light on the mechanisms behind these results. My study suggests that electoral competition, party alignment between national and local politicians, and the minister’s interest play pivotal roles in shaping security provisions across the country

Date: 2024-02-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:osfxxx:znyq5

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/znyq5

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