Do Benevolent Rulers Impose Economic Reforms?

Andrew Riggsby

No 3vcmp, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Several recent arguments have claimed that various features of Roman law (unavailability of an executory contract of barter; regimes of protection against latent defects and for land title; rules for generic sale) take the shapes they do so as to produce a variety of economic efficiencies. This paper offers two critiques of these accounts. (1) They lack an adequate account of the bounded rationality and motivations of the law-makers. (2) In many cases they misstate the legal rules in question in ways that exaggerate the resulting efficiencies.

Date: 2024-08-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-hpe and nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:3vcmp

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/3vcmp

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