Power Entropy Increase: A Fundamental Principle of Power Evolution

Qilin Guo

No 5h4j2_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Drawing on the broad historical trend of power decentralization, this paper proposes the Principle of Power Entropy Increase, introducing the concept of power entropy and its mathematical formulation to systematically illuminate the evolutionary shift of power structures from concentration to dispersion. Power entropy increase is framed as a natural response of social systems to the challenges of power scarcity, structural complexity, and governance pressure—serving as the underlying logic that drives the evolution of public governance toward democratic institutions. On this basis, the paper is the first to advance and rigorously substantiate the theoretical proposition that democracy is the inevitable trajectory of institutional evolution. It contends that democracy is not born of ideological design, but arises as a structurally optimal outcome driven by systemic dynamics—a Nash equilibrium in the context of generalized social games. This principle offers not only a new perspective on political modernization and institutional transition, but also a theoretical foundation and analytical tool for assessing and forecasting transformations in power structures.

Date: 2025-05-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:5h4j2_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/5h4j2_v1

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