The Discretionary Color Line in International Institutions

Andrew Rosenberg

No 962sx_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: A growing literature documents racial hierarchy in international institutions. I test whether formally equal rules eliminate that hierarchy in practice. The Schengen visa regime offers a hard case because member states process applications under identical law. I show that ancestral distance, a measure of perceived racial difference, predicts visa refusals. Contemporary ancestral distance drives the result. A pre-1500 measure does not, consistent with the social construction of race. A consulate-level analysis isolates the discretionary channel. Busier consulates discriminate more against ancestrally distant applicants, even though a nationality's risk profile does not change with consular workload. Routine operational pressures activate the categorical shortcuts that institutional design was supposed to prevent. A further test shows the effect is stronger where national populations hold more restrictive racial attitudes, not where institutional capacity is weakest. Harmonized rules do not eliminate international institutional racism. They push it into discretionary gaps that formal law cannot close.

Date: 2026-05-26
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:962sx_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/962sx_v1

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