Geopolitical Constraints and Strategic Natural Gas Exports: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Iran–Qatar Interaction in the European Market

Sorour Moradipoor and Seyed Abdolmajid Jalaee

No awh2s_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: This paper develops a non-cooperative game-theoretic model to analyze strategic natural gas export decisions under binding geopolitical and institutional constraints, focusing on Iran–Qatar interaction in the European market. Export strategies are defined as empirically grounded regimes rather than continuous quantities, capturing observed export suspensions and partial utilization under sanctions and infrastructural frictions. The model incorporates quantity-dependent production and transportation costs as well as explicit geopolitical constraint penalties. Scenario-based payoff matrices calibrated to post-2022 market conditions reveal that rising constraint costs can render high-export strategies unprofitable even at elevated gas prices. The analysis identifies an asymmetric Nash equilibrium in which Qatar maintains high exports while Iran optimally reduces or suspends exports. These results highlight that institutional access and geopolitical frictions, rather than resource endowments alone, are central determinants of export behavior and European energy security in fragmented gas markets. Keywords: Geopolitical constraints; Natural gas exports; Game theory; European gas market; Iran–Qatar interaction; Energy security.

Date: 2025-12-27
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:awh2s_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/awh2s_v1

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