Censorship in Large Societies

Kun Heo and Antoine Zerbini

No cjth9_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: An authoritarian regime faces a heterogeneous citizenry that consumes information from a regime- controlled and an opposition outlet that is known to be, if anything, biased against the regime. We characterize the optimal reporting strategy for the regime-controlled outlet and the existence of censorship incentives for the regime, assuming that censorship is cost-less. Fixing a median citizen, whether censorship is optimal depends on where the mass of citizens lie on either side of the median citizen. In polarized societies, a non-monotonic relationship emerges between censorship incentives and the opposition outlet’s reporting slant against the regime.

Date: 2024-06-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:cjth9_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/cjth9_v1

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