Do Pay-for-Grades Programs Encourage Student Cheating? Evidence from a randomized experiment

Tao Li and Yisu Zhou
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Yisu Zhou: University of Macau

No ck9z6, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Pay-for-grade programs were adopted in many schools within the past two decades. Despite doubts over its effectiveness in improve students performances, educators worry that monetary incentive could skew student learning motivation and lead to academic cheating. Due to data limitation, there has been scant empirical study on this issue. Using a randomized control trial in Chinese migrant primary schools, we studied the effects of pay-for-grades programs on academic cheating. We provide new insights into the feasibility of such policy to improve learning outcomes, show concerning levels of cheating in Chinese migrant schools, and discuss its policy implications.

Date: 2017-11-17
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:ck9z6

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/ck9z6

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