Great Power Competition: Lessons from the Past, Implications for the Future
Alexander Vuving
No dmvbw, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science
Abstract:
Throughout the 52-century long history of great power competition, human dynamics, technology, and geography are the most consequential and most permanent factors that have shaped the interaction among the great powers. This essay mines the past for lessons about great power competition by examining the structural impact of these factors on the rise and fall of great powers, the balance of power among them, and the character of their relations. In order to aid its analysis, the essay introduces three concepts that have not been discussed in the literature: 1) The system-changers: actors that are not system-makers like the great powers but have the power to change the international system and disrupt the balance of power among the system-makers. 2) The strategic structure of great power competition: a structure that emerges from the interaction of the players’ preferences and determines the best strategies for the players as well as the stable outcomes of their game. The essay argues that the Thucydides Trap does not exist in the US-China rivalry because the strategic structure of this rivalry is that of either a Game of Chicken or a Peace-lover’s Dilemma. Using game theory and geopolitics, the essay is able to make long-term predictions and strategy implications for the US-China rivalry. 3) The peace-lover’s dilemma: an asymmetric game whose stable outcome is the dominance of the more aggressive player (who prefers its own supremacy to sharing power with the other) over the less aggressive player (who prefers sharing power with the other to its own supremacy), hence this is a dilemma for the game’s peace-loving player.
Date: 2020-09-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:dmvbw
DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/dmvbw
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