Pick Your Poison: The Attribution Paradox in Cyberwar

Eric Jardine and Nathaniel D Porter
Additional contact information
Nathaniel D Porter: Virginia Tech

No etb72, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Certainty matters in cyberspace. The so-called attribution problem can impede deterrence, making cyberattacks more likely. But attribution problems can also limit conflict escalation, keeping nations safer. Using a discrete choice experimental design, this article quantifies the scope of the attribution problem for both deterrence and escalation. The results suggest that the attribution problem is really only a problem for deterrence and actually helps limit conflict escalation by reducing support for more severe retaliatory options.

Date: 2020-02-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://osf.io/download/5e56b0a035d22d02fb5f67a0/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:etb72

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/etb72

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SocArXiv from Center for Open Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by OSF ().