The Computational Complexity of Nash Equilibria

Janet Rosenbaum

No h63mz, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Although the computation of Nash equlibria for general games is of unknown complexity, there exist many algorithms for specific game classes, some of which are a marked improvement of previous algorithms. This paper reviews general results on the computational complexity of Nash equilibria and discusses the major algorithms for specific game classes.

Date: 2002-05-15
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:h63mz

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/h63mz

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