The Economics of Gossip: Informal Information Markets in Social Networks

Ralph Rendell Toledo

No n7m8r_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Information plays an important role in economic decision-making. Most economic studies focus on formal systems such as markets, institutions, and contracts. However, individuals also obtain information through everyday conversations within social networks. This study examines gossip, often called chismis, as a form of informal information exchange. Using a conceptual research approach based on interdisciplinary literature synthesis, the study develops a framework explaining how information derived from personal experiences spreads through gossip, shapes reputation, and influences economic behavior. Individuals often rely on information shared by friends, neighbors, or coworkers when deciding whom to trust, cooperate with, or buy from. The framework identifies four elements: information generation, gossip transmission, reputation formation, and economic decision-making. It highlights how decentralized conversational information flows produce reputational signals that reduce uncertainty and shape economic interactions. The study contributes to information economics by conceptualizing gossip as an informal information market within social networks.

Date: 2026-03-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:n7m8r_v1

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/n7m8r_v1

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