Information About Vacancy Competition Redirects Job Search

Monica Bhole, Andrey Fradkin and John Horton

No p82fk, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Job seekers typically do not know the degree of competition they face for a particular vacancy. As a result, they may unwittingly send applications to vacancies with a lot of competition and may overlook vacancies with little competition. We study how providing information about competition for a vacancy redirects applications. To do so, we conduct three field experiments on a large online job platform in which treated job searchers are shown information about the number of prior applicants to a vacancy. This information increases overall applications and redirects applications to vacancies with few prior applications. Applications are sent to vacancies that receive fewer cumulative applications but result in similar outcomes to control applications. We use a complementary treatment to show that job seekers also use the age of the vacancy to direct search towards newer vacancies with relatively little competition. Our results are consistent with a model in which searchers have imperfect information about competition for a vacancy and redirect their search towards less competitive vacancies when they receive an improved signal.

Date: 2021-04-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:p82fk

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/p82fk

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