Leaves instead of ballots: The Colombian formal and informal governance of coca

Juan Sebastián Lara-Rodríguez

No przdf_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Colombia produces more coca than ever, yet scholarship remains anchored in security frameworks that overlook how institutional configurations shape this illegal crop. This article treats coca cultivation as a governance outcome, arguing that the interaction between formal institutions — political parties and electoral processes — and informal entities — criminal and rebel armed groups — determines where coca takes root. Drawïing on a municipality-level panel covering the national territory from 2011 to 2023, and employing fixed effects, spatial Durbin models, and a difference-in-differences leveraging the 2016 peace settlement, the analysis reveals that no party or coalition bears a signifïicant association with coca once municipal heterogeneity is absorbed. What persistently predicts cultivation is electoral fraud risk and armed group presence, specially the ELN guerrilla. The latest peace accord caused coca expansion rather than contraction. These findings suggest that phasing out coca demands strengthening democracy and extending the rule of law to plantation clusters.

Date: 2026-10-14
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:przdf_v1

DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/przdf_v1

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