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Beyond Bürgergeld: Who Can Afford to Say No? Guaranteed Minimum Income, the Refusal of Work, and Control over One's Time

Klaus-Uwe Gerhardt

No r7fje_v1, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: Germany’s July 2026 welfare reform strengthened the priority of job placement and the use of benefit sanctions, reinforcing the disciplinary role of means-tested income support. This paper examines whether a guaranteed min-imum income (GMI), independent of work-availability requirements, could weaken these pressures and strengthen workers’ capacity to resist unfavorable employment conditions. Drawing on Italian operaismo, the paper approaches wage labor and social protection as contested relations of power. Its central premise is that economic dependence and workplace domination can generate resistance and that collective countervailing power can emerge even under adverse conditions. The analysis distinguishes individual autonomy, bargaining power, and collective organization as related but dis-tinct dimensions of economic security. Evidence from recent cash-transfer experiments is examined alongside the institutional alternative of an adequate, accessible minimum-income scheme with limited work requirements. The findings suggest that material security can expand individual choices, but neither improved working conditions nor collective power follows automatically. A guaranteed minimum income cannot replace collective struggle. It may, however, change the material conditions under which workers resist, organize, and challenge existing power relations.

Date: 2026-11-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:r7fje_v1

DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/r7fje_v1

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