Beasts of Prey or Rational Animals? Private Governance in Brazil's Jogo do Bicho

Danilo Freire
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Danilo Freire: Brown University

No se2jr, SocArXiv from Center for Open Science

Abstract: This article presents a rational choice account of Brazil's jogo do bicho ('animal game'), possibly the largest illegal lottery game in the world. In over 120 years, the jogo do bicho has grown from a local raffle to a multimillion-dollar business, and the game has played a major role in Brazil's cultural and political life. My analysis of the jogo do bicho has three goals. First, I examine the mechanisms that fostered the lottery's notable growth outside the boundaries of Brazilian law. Second, I investigate how the animal game financiers combine costly signals and selective incentives to induce cooperation from members of the community. Lastly, I discuss the relationship between the lottery sponsors and Brazilian representatives, particularly how the bicheiros exploit the fragmentation of Brazil's political system to advance their long-term interests.

Keywords: Brazil; criminal organisations; gambling; jogo do bicho; private governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 K42 P26 P37 Z00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03-18
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:osf:socarx:se2jr

DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/se2jr

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